Ferrari Luce: the electric prancing horse that divides the world (and perhaps saves the Cavallino's future)

When Ferrari unveiled "Luce", its first fully electric vehicle, the internet stopped breathing for a moment. Then it exploded. Social media tore the House of Maranello apart with a speed almost worthy of a 0-to-100 acceleration. The stock market, always brutal in its immediate judgments, responded by wiping out 8% of the company's value in a single day, evaporating billions of euros like morning fog. Even Luca Cordero di Montezemolo, the man who for decades built the very identity of the brand, publicly stated he hoped the Prancing Horse would be removed from that vehicle. Five hundred and fifty thousand euros, no engine noise, no V12 screaming out of a corner. For many, an industrial sacrilege.

The first reaction, even for those who study brands professionally, was visceral: what on earth were they thinking in Maranello? The most desired brand on the planet, built over decades on roar, adrenaline and an almost mythical exclusivity, suddenly silent. Yet, if you set aside the fan instinct and reason like a business owner, history tells a very different and far less reassuring script for those criticizing Ferrari.

Nokia, in 2007, controlled 49% of the global smartphone market. Half the planet had a Nokia in their pocket. When Apple introduced the iPhone, Finnish executives dismissed the touchscreen as a passing fad. By 2013, Nokia's market share had crashed to 3%. Then silence. Blackberry, in 2009, was the phone of power: businesspeople, executives, politicians. Physical keyboard, encrypted email, locked-down ecosystem. It held 20% of the global market. Then the world wanted large screens and apps. By 2016, Blackberry's market share stood at 0.048%. Gone. Kodak is the most emblematic and almost grotesque case: it was an internal company engineer who invented the first digital camera in 1975. Executives blocked the project to avoid cannibalizing the film business. In 2012, Kodak filed for bankruptcy. Blockbuster could have bought Netflix for fifty million dollars. They laughed. Then they disappeared.

All these brands had an elegant way out: create a separate sub-brand to innovate without touching the main positioning. Nokia could have launched a touchscreen line. Kodak could have created an autonomous digital brand. Blackberry could have developed a dedicated full-screen device. They didn't. They chose to protect the historic brand. And they died anyway, but without even having played the game.

Ferrari chose the opposite. It put the Prancing Horse on "Luce", played with its cards face up, exposed itself to fire. Is it a risky bet? Absolutely. But at least it is sitting at the table of the future, not watching from the stands.

There is a deep industrial logic behind this decision. The Ferrari customer of 2040 is fourteen years old today. They grew up with Tesla, with instant acceleration, with electric silence as the perceived standard of modernity. For that generation, the roar of the V12 might not be pure emotion. It might simply be old noise. Meanwhile, the European Commission has set 2035 as the deadline for ending new registrations of internal combustion engine vehicles. Brussels has opened the door to possible revisions of the regulation, but the industrial direction of the automotive sector will not reverse. Source: EU Regulation 2023/851 and official communications from the European Commission.

The real question is therefore not whether an electric Ferrari is emotionally right or wrong. The question is whether Ferrari wants to arrive at the future as a protagonist or as a museum piece, perhaps with the V12 running for tourists. Those who innovate too early get attacked, mocked, criticized. Those who innovate too late usually disappear. The real mistake, throughout business history, has almost never been innovating. The real mistake is waiting for everyone else to do it first.

Sources: Nokia and Blackberry market data from Statista and IDC; Kodak history from Harvard Business Review; Blockbuster-Netflix case from public documentation; European regulation from EUR-Lex, EU Regulation 2023/851.